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ABSTRACT
H. Ross Perot’s 19% showing in the 1992 presidential election was made possible 
by a large group of volunteers, comprising Democrats and Republicans as well as 
Independents. Of these, the most active were Independents, while Republicans were more 
active than Democrats. This Republican Perot activism was motivated by dissatisfaction with 
the economy’s performance and, to a lesser extent, a gap between the issue positions of these 
activists and the Republican party.
PEROT ACTIVISM IN 1992 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
INTRODUCTION
In the 1992 presidential campaign H. Ross Perot garnered 19% of the popular vote, 
the strongest showing for a third-party candidate since ex-president Theodore Roosevelt’s 
1924 run. Perot owed his electoral strength to a huge campaign war chest, inventive use of 
media, and an army of volunteer campaign workers who answered phones, collected ballot 
petition signatures, canvassed door to door, attended fund raisers and rallies, spoke to the 
news media, and tried to convince their friends to support Perot. Overnight, activists emerged 
to support a candidate with no existing campaign infrastructure, no party organization, and 
no endorsements by major political figures. Who were these people?
Many of them were independents, whose numbers reflected the often-observed 
decline of party identification. Perot appealed successfully to this natural constituency of 
citizens disinclined to support the major party candidates. Independents showed the highest 
level of campaign activity for Perot. Some were Democrats, willing to support a candidate 
outside their party. The rest were Republicans, willing not only to support a candidate outside 
their party, but to work against the sitting Republican president, George Bush. These 
Republicans were even more active than their Democratic counterparts on Perot’s campaign.
Why were Republicans more active for Perot than Democrats? Did their defection 
from party ranks represent disaffection for the party, or for the nominee? Was this 
disaffection based on attitudinal factors such as ideology or issues, or on some other factor? 
What does this behavior imply for their future party identification and electoral behavior?
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3How will this in turn affect the major parties and their ability to elect their nominees?
The answers to these questions have electoral consequences for the Republican party 
in the years to come. Perot focused his attack on the status quo, which at the time included 
a Republican president. His campaign attracted more Republican volunteers than Democrats, 
and these Republicans were in turn more active on the campaign than Democrats. If Perot’s 
appeal to Republicans was based on antipathy toward Bush, Bush’s defeat in 1992 should 
allow those Republicans who defected from their party to return and support future 
Republican candidates. On the other hand, if Republicans supported Perot in preference to 
their party nominee in 1992 because they felt out of place in the party, they could remain 
open to appeals in the future for votes and political activity outside the party. Perot pulled 
votes about equally from Clinton and Bush, and therefore did not cost the Republican party 
the election. But by drawing more heavily on Republican rather than Democratic activists, 
Perot’s presence robbed the Republican party of potential volunteer support and organizing 
activity. The prospect of losing this group of voters and activists in future elections should 
cause concern to Republican strategists.
In this paper I argue that the key to Perot’s appeal among Republicans was the 
alienation these activists felt from their party and their party nominee on specific issues and, 
most importantly, on their perceptions of the economy. Republicans felt that the national 
economy had done poorly, and they judged Perot as better able to handle economic problems 
than Bush. In addition, the judgment that Bush would do poorly in the election and that Perot 
would have a strong showing motivated Republican activity for Perot. The implication of 
these findings is that Republican Perot activists will be open to appeals from outside the 
party in the future.
4This paper has five sections. Section I summarizes previous studies and findings. 
Section II describes the primary sample used in the analysis. Section ID outlines theoretical 
approaches to understanding the phenomenon of defection from party. Section IV presents 
data on causes of Perot activism. Section V lists conclusions.
SECTION I. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Previous studies of third-party candidates have emphasized the role of alienation as
a key factor contributing to third-party strength (Mazmanian 1984; Rosenstone, Behr, and
Lazarus 1984; Smallwood 1983; Gillespie 1993). A main line of argument clusters around
issues which divide the electorate. Thus Mazmanian (1978, p.312) argues that
the emergence of significant third parties depends on the coincidence of four 
factors: severe national conflict over a few very important issues...; division 
of the electorate into at least one intense estranged minority and a broad 
majority; rejection or avoidance of the position of the minority by both major 
parties, causing alienation of the minority; and a politician or political group 
willing to exploit the situation by initiating a new party.
In particular, according to Mazmanian, economic issues have the ability to polarize
segments of society sensitive to the business cycle, but such parties lose their appeal as the
major parties address economic concerns and regain the support of the disenfranchised. More
significant third party movements, such as the American Independent Party of George
Wallace, derive their appeal from more persistent societal cleavages, such as race relations
and the Vietnam war.
Similarly Rosenstone et al. argue that the success of third parties is attributable to the
unresponsiveness of the major parties, particularly on economic issues.
“Major party failure is the primary force motivating third party voting in 
America. When the two major parties deteriorate -  when they neglect the 
concerns of significant blocs of voters, mismanage the economy, or nominate 
unqualified candidates -  voters turn to a third party alternative. Prominent 
third party challengers... also prompt citizens to abandon the major parties.”
(1984, p .181)
Smallwood (1983, p.278) isolates a similar set of factors: “conditions of political
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6crisis; high levels of public dissatisfaction with the major parties; and the prominence and 
visibility of third-party nominees.”
As Smallwood notes, dissatisfaction with the major parties has been rising since the 
1960s, raising concerns that the electorate has entered a period of “dealignment” as proposed 
by Ladd (1982). Party loyalties have weakened, leaving a large proportion of the electorate 
“up for grabs.” This weakening of party loyalties is documented by Wattenberg (1990), 
although Wattenberg takes heart at his finding that voters are increasingly neutral toward 
parties, rather than specifically negative. Another view on partisan realignment is offered by 
Paul Allen Beck’s “socialization theory of partisan realignment” (1974). Beck suggests that 
a generation of voters who were ripe for realignment would either realign or would, upon 
reaching their thirtieth birthday, become unavailable for political mobilization, “contributing 
to an increasingly severe decline of party.”
Most of the work on third parties has focused on explaining third party vote rather 
than activism. The most notable exception is Canfield’s (1984) study of Wallace activism 
in Wayne County, Michigan. Proclaiming that “there’s not a dime’s worth of difference 
between the Democratic and Republican parties” and offering voters “a choice, not an echo,” 
George Wallace’s independent campaign in 1968 attracted activists whom, according to 
Canfield, fell into the two groups of racial reactionary and ultraconservative. These activists 
agreed with Wallace and found little difference between the two major parties on the issues 
of interest to them, but much difference between the major parties and the American 
Independent Party. Compared to Wallace voters, Wallace activists were more concerned with 
an internal Communist threat, reflecting less trust in the political system.
Important differences existed between the two main subgroups of Wallace supporters.
7Racial reactionaries were responding to urban violence and the civil rights movement, while 
ultraconservatives sought a return to pre-New Deal domestic and foreign policy. Canfield 
concluded that ideological disputes between these two groups over social welfare policy 
issues such as Medicare and Social Security (both of which were favored by the racial 
reactionary and opposed by the ultraconservative), coupled with organizational and other 
squabbles, splintered the coalition built around Wallace, effectively dooming its electoral 
prospects after 1968.
Was Perot’s showing in 1992 a sign of impending realignment of existing voters 
away from political parties or towards one of the major parties? Or did he mobilize vast 
numbers of previously inactive citizens? In either case, did the 1992 Perot activists have 
enough goals and ideas in common to remain a force in American politics, or are they likely 
to move into one of the major parties as Wallace supporters did?
SECTION n. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE
The data used in this thesis were collected from a random sample of callers to Perot’s 
800 number in Dallas who were entered into a national database during the spring and 
summer of 1992. By the time Perot dropped out of the race in July, this database included 
nearly 500,000 callers. A sample of 2,000 names was drawn from this base, of which 1,901 
were usable addresses. Not all of the callers became involved in the Perot campaign, and not 
all voted for Perot. Rapoport and Stone sent mail questionnaires to these 1,901 callers in 
September of 1992. Of this group, 1,334 sent back completed questionnaires, a response rate 
of 70%. Immediately after the 1992 election these respondents were mailed a follow-up 
survey, returned by 944 individuals (a response rate of 71% of the first wave respondents). 
Both surveys included questions about demographics, party affiliation, prior political activity, 
other campaign involvement, attitudes about parties, candidates, and governmental 
institutions, and activism for Perot.
Activism for the Perot/Stockdale ticket during the general election (after the party 
conventions) was measured in this sample with a battery of questions in the post-election 
survey asking respondents to report activities they had performed. The activities were: 
collecting signatures for a ballot petition, contributing $100 or less, contributing more than 
$100, telephoning or door to door canvassing, trying to convince friends to support the ticket, 
attending a fundraiser, and attending a public meeting or rally. Activities were then counted 
to form a scale ranging from zero to six.
Overall, 57.1% of the sample engaged in some activity for the Perot/Stockdale
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9ticket in the general election, compared to the slightly lower 53.1% which voted for it. When 
broken down by party affiliation, independents were most likely to engage in some Perot 
activity (70.7%), followed by Republicans (61.6%), and Democrats (44.5%). It is striking 
that 17% more Republicans engaged in Perot activity than Democrats, suggesting that the 
Perot ticket held greater appeal for Republicans than for Democrats. The same pattern for the 
prevalence of activity also holds for the amount of activity, as shown by Figure 1, which 
shows the mean number of Perot activities by party identification: independents showed the 
highest number of activities, followed by Republicans, then Democrats.
SECTION HI: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Causes of Perot Activism: Push and Pull
The two main types of factors which influence the decision to be active for Perot or 
any candidate can be classed under the headings of "push" and "pull;" that is, a potential 
activist may choose to support a given candidate because she dislikes the other candidates 
(she is "pushed" away from them) or because she is attracted to a candidate on some relevant 
dimension (she is "pulled" toward the candidate) (Rapoport and Stone, 1993). In many cases, 
we can expect some combination of "push" and "pull" to have influenced a given activist’s 
choice to support a given candidate. This is particularly the case for third-party candidates, 
given that most of the population (and even more activists) identify themselves as members 
of one of the two major parties, from which we can assume a predisposition toward the 
candidates of their respective parties. In explaining defections from the two major parties, 
it is possible that both Democrats and Republicans were predominantly pushed away from 
their parties, that both were pulled to a third party candidate, or some other permutation (for 
example, that Democrats were pushed and Republicans pulled). In order to separate push 
from pull, what needs to be evaluated is the role that alienation (from candidate, party, or 
some other target) played in the decisions of individuals of different parties to engage in 
activity on behalf of Perot, relative to any attraction they might have to Perot on this or some 
other dimension.
Strategic Implications of a Three-Way Race
In any given race, we can expect that voters are both pushed and pulled, and the
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process can be thought of as sequential. In order to overcome the predisposition to support 
the party with which they identify, a voter or activist must be significantly alienated from his 
party. By itself, however, alienation does not produce activism, since an alienated voter or 
activist might simply sit out a campaign in which he disapproves of his party nominee. If, on 
the other hand, an activist both disapproves of his party nominee and is attracted to another 
candidate, he has the opportunity to be active for that other candidate.
Party identification can be seen as having two behavioral implications. The first is 
a predisposition to support the candidates of a particular party. In addition, party 
identification represents a predisposition not to support candidates from the opposition party, 
since this would be seen as inconsistent with being a member of the party.
In a two-candidate election, the net effect of push and pull are identical, and may be 
thought of as one phenomenon; for example, a Democratic voter who defects and votes for 
a Republican may have experienced only push away from the Democrat, or only pull toward 
the Republican, or both. Whatever path his decision took, the only alternative to voting his 
party identification is voting for the opposition party.
This calculus is more complicated, however, for an activist looking at a three- 
candidate election in which two candidates are the nominees of the major parties and one 
candidate is an independent.1 For example, a Democrat who dislikes the Democratic nominee 
but is not prepared to support a Republican can abide by his party identification in part by 
supporting the independent candidate. Thus we can conceive of his choice on whom to 
support as a choice between the options of his party nominee and the independent candidate,
xThe candidacy of John Anderson in 1980, for instance, received a boost from 
voters dissatisfied with the major party candidates (Rosenstone et al., 1984).
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rather than the usual choice between his party nominee and the opposition party nominee. 
An independent candidate offers the opportunity for public activism and political 
involvement without requiring as complete a defection from his party. Particularly for an 
individual who feels internally efficacious and concerned about political issues, activism for 
an independent candidate would be preferable to abstaining from activism or voting.
People who identify themselves as ‘pure’ independents indicate no preference for one 
major party over the other. Because such citizens are likely to hold the parties in low esteem, 
we may view their choice of non-partisanship as a predisposition to refrain from supporting 
the candidates of either major party. We would therefore expect independents to be very 
open to appeals by the independent candidate, since by so doing they avoid supporting either 
major party. Their choice of activism or vote may thus be seen as a choice between the 
independent candidate and the major party candidate to which they feel closest.
Constraints on Third Parties
In choosing to discard the nominees of their parties, Democrats and Republicans must 
overcome their usual predisposition to support these nominees. Rosenstone claims that the 
third party vote is a path of last resort, that voters consider such a move only after they have 
disposed of the major party candidates (1984). This historical failure of third parties to draw 
large percentages of votes may be explained by a number of factors which Rosenstone 
identifies, such as the extreme issue positions of third parties and the negligible chance of 
their electoral success, barriers to ballot access and low campaign funding, as well as the 
first-past-the-post system, and attitudinal constraints such as loyalty to the major parties and 
low name recognition of third party candidates. In the 1992 election many of these barriers
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were removed or surmounted by the Perot campaign, making support for H. Ross Perot a 
more palatable alternative for disaffected partisans than support for the opposition party.
Another hurdle often faced by third party candidates is name recognition. It is for this 
reason that Rosenstone et al. find that only “nationally prestigious” third-party candidates do 
as well as Perot did. Within certain groups, such as the veterans and business communities, 
Perot was fairly well known before his campaign began. In addition to his well-publicized 
mission to rescue captive employees in Iran, generous media attention in the early days of 
the campaign, much of it free, gave Perot national name recognition. This media coverage 
has a self-reinforcing aspect: little-known candidates cannot get coverage to become viable 
precisely because they are little-known. Candidates judged to be front-runners, on the other 
hand, benefit from a disproportionate amount of coverage, much of it favorable (Bartels, 
1988). Perot’s candidacy was lifted by early favorable press coverage, including coverage of 
the efforts of volunteers to put him on the ballot after his invitation to them on the Larry 
King Live! show in February. Such coverage helped his standing in the polls before the 
national party conventions, at a time when the major party candidates were still securing their 
nominations in order to run against each other. In polls of three-way matchups against Bush 
and Clinton, Perot drew 16% in late March, 25% in May, and 37% in early June leading 
Bush and Clinton with 24% each (Lichter and Noyes, 1995). High poll numbers early in the 
campaign reinforced his image as a serious contender.
Most third-party campaigns lack money. The major party nominees, once they get to 
the general election, do not. Indeed, the law which guarantees matching funds to candidates 
over a certain threshold has been called a “major party protection act” (Rosenstone et al., 
p.26), since it rewards parties which already have a broad base of contributors. By pledging
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to spend $60 million of his own money on his campaign, Perot swiftly disposed of any 
concerns that his campaign would be underfunded and therefore doomed to failure. Perot’s 
“wallet on the table” gave the campaign instant viability, simultaneously offering potential 
activists an opportunity to work on a well-funded campaign and removing the necessity for 
fund-raising, which normally takes up a substantial portion of campaign resources. In 
interviews of Perot campaign organizers in Virginia conducted by Spang, Perot’s financial 
independence was cited “by every former official as the key factor for his initial support” 
(Spang, 1994).
The Perot campaign also benefited from numerous court cases brought by previous 
third-party candidates challenging restrictive ballot access laws, including George Wallace 
in 1968, Eugene McCarthy in 1976 (who filed 18 suits), and John Anderson in 1980 (who 
successfully challenged electoral laws in 10 states) (Rosenstone et al., 1984). The Perot 
campaign gained access to the ballot through petition signatures, rather than through party 
primaries, but the effect of a successful petition drive was similar. The campaign publicly 
announced when they would be submitting the petition signatures so as to maximize media 
coverage, and this coverage in turn promoted Perot's candidacy. Despite the outpouring of 
support Perot experienced in some areas, the Perot campaign had considerable difficulty in 
putting Perot on the ballot in all fifty states. Because petition laws vary across states, 
requiring filings on different dates, a considerable amount of organization was required to 
coordinate the petition drives. Much of this effort was staffed by volunteers with little 
experience in politics or management, and they were hindered as much as helped by methods 
of organization dictated by Dallas headquarters (Spang, 1994). The difficulty of the petition 
undertaking is evidenced by the fact that even the well-financed Perot campaign did not
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know until very close to the election whether Perot would be on the ballot in all the states.
The only third-party candidate who captured more of the popular vote in a 
presidential election was Teddy Roosevelt, and Perot’s candidacy had some striking 
similarities to Roosevelt’s. More than any other third-party ticket, Roosevelt’s Bull Moose 
Progressive party was centered around one candidate, rather than an established party 
ideology or set of issues. As Rosenstone puts it, “Every previous third party run began with 
a party, which in turn selected a nominee. But in 1912 Roosevelt was the party. Had he not 
run, it is unlikely there would have been a Progressive challenge that year” (Rosenstone et 
al., 1984). Just as Roosevelt’s candidacy was the reason for the Progressive Party’s existence, 
so too was Perot’s candidacy the spark for the formation of a campaign apparatus which 
became United We Stand, America following the election.
An important way that Perot’s campaign differed from Roosevelt’s was that Perot did 
not even attempt to form a party for his 1992 run. Perot ran as an independent candidate, not 
on a United We Stand ticket, and there were no other candidates backed by United We Stand 
in 1992 other than Perot and his running mate James Stockdale. United We Stand until late 
1995 was officially an educational organization whose tax-exempt status prohibits it from 
endorsing candidates for office; this effectively prevented it from becoming a political party, 
barring major organizational change.2 By contrast, 14 candidates were elected to the House 
of Representatives on a Progressive Party ticket in 1912, although the party decayed soon
2Although it was widely interpreted that the group had endorsed Kay Bailey 
Hutchison in the Texas special election to replace Lloyd Bentsen, Perot’s announcement 
in June of 1993 (three days before a runoff between Hutchison and appointee Bob 
Krueger) was that the state United We Stand chapter had been polled and that 84% 
supported Hutchison. Perot later gave personal endorsements to other candidates.
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thereafter and disbanded completely when Roosevelt declined its nomination for president 
in 1916. In this respect Perot's campaign more closely resembles other independent 
candidacies in the latter half of this century, notably those of George Wallace in 1968, 
Eugene McCarthy in 1976, and John Anderson in 1980 (Beck and Sorauf 1992).
Far from disabling him, Perot’s independence from all political parties worked to his 
advantage. Because he was not hindered by the usual obstacles of third party politics, he was 
able to market himself not only to voters in search of a change from the incumbent 
administration, but also to those disaffected with the major party candidates or with party 
politics generally.
In the Section IV, I analyze possible sources of alienation from political parties, 
focusing mainly on explanations of why Republicans defected from Bush to Perot. I analyze 
three traditional factors relating to party: ideology, issues, and economic performance. In 
each case I compare Republicans to Democrats and independents, and attempt to determine 
whether the differences between these groups on measures of alienation account for observed 
differences in Perot activism.
TABLE 1
get rid of parties 
parties confuse issues
Percent agreeing
Democrats Independents Republicans
32.6% 57.1% 27.5%
71.0 89.6 72.6
N 324
Source: Perot sample data
182 379
SECTION IV: PEROT SAMPLE DATA
Parties and Party System
The potential Perot activists in the sample generally held both parties in low esteem. 
Only 64.1% of those identifying themselves as Democrats rated their party average or better; 
the rest rated it below average or poor. More predictably, these Democrats rated the 
Republican party very negatively, with only 12.1% rating it average or better. Among 
independents, 30.5% rated the Democratic party average or better, while fully 49.8% gave 
it the lowest rating of “poor.” The Republican party fared worse; only 17.3% of independents 
rated it average or better, while 58.5% rated it poor. Republicans identifiers rated the 
Democratic party average or better in 15.2% of the cases, with 54.1% rating it poor; 53.7% 
rated their own party average or better, with the rest, nearly half, rating it below average or 
poor. For all three party groupings, the mean evaluation score for both parties is negative.
Two other questions asked attitudes on the party system generally, and not a specific 
party. Respondents were asked whether they agreed that government would work more 
efficiently if we could get rid of parties altogether, and whether parties confuse issues more 
than offer a clear choice between them. The most negative answers toward the party system 
came, not surprisingly, from independents, but even among partisans almost a third 
supported the radiacal step of getting rid of parties.
These figures serve to illustrate the anti-party feelings present in the sample and raise 
the question: what were the sources of alienation from the parties? Was dissatisfaction 
focused on the candidates, issues, or ideology?
17
18
Party Ideology
At a more specific level, individuals might feel that their own party is out of step with 
them ideologically, that it is too liberal or too conservative for their tastes.3 Because parties 
in the United States do not espouse specific ideologies separate from their presidential 
nominees, it would be surprising if respondents were to characterize their dissatisfaction with 
parties in terms of ideology. In order to test whether ideological alienation from the parties 
correlates with activism for Perot, I calculated a variable giving perceived ideological 
distance from one’s own party for Democrats and Republicans, and from the nearer of the 
two parties for independents.
The absolute value of the difference between the respondent’s own ideology and the 
perceived ideology of the party yields a subjective measure of distance between the 
respondent’s ideology and his or her party’s ideology. In keeping with the idea that citizens 
evaluate opportunities for activism in a three-way race first as a choice between their party 
and the independent candidate, the difference between the distances to the party and Perot 
are computed for partisan identifiers; independents are assumed to be predisposed toward 
Perot activism ahead of activism for the major parties. This yields a score ranging from zero 
to six which measures the respondent’s agreement with his party’s ideology on an issue, 
relative to his agreement with Perot. For example, a Democrat who identifies herself as very 
conservative (a score of 7), perceives the Democratic party as very liberal (a score of 1), and 
Perot as fairly conservative (a score of 6) is six units away from the Democratic party and 
one unit away from Perot; subtracting one from six yields a score of five in agreement with
3“Ideology” here refers to self-placement on a seven-point scale from very liberal 
to very conservative.
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Perot. A negative score would indicate greater agreement with the Democrats.
As a predictor of Perot activism, this variable is significant only for Democrats (data 
not shown). This is interesting, since the effect is significant even when controlling for 
strength of partisanship. Democrats rather than Republicans reacted to what they saw as a 
gap between their own and the party’s ideology by engaging in Perot activism. In other 
words, Democrats who felt the Democratic party was too liberal were more likely to support 
Perot; this does not hold true for Republicans who found the Republican party too 
conservative. As a measure of alienation then, ideological consistency with party does not 
explain why Republicans would be more likely than Democrats to defect to Perot.
Candidate Ideology
Given the current focus of campaigns on candidates as opposed to parties it is 
appropriate to look for ideological effects from evaluations of the ideology of candidates. 
Using a spatial model, I compared the distance between respondent ideology and that of the 
respondent’s party nominee with the distance to Perot; for independents the distances 
compared were between Perot and the closest major party candidate. As with the perceived 
distance to party ideology, an effect is found among Democrats, even when controlling for 
strength of partisanship (data not shown). Again, while this is an interesting difference 
between Democrats and Republicans, the effect does not explain why Republicans showed 
more Perot activity than Democrats. While Democrats show higher Perot activity the further 
away they saw themselves from Clinton’s ideology, relative to their distance from Perot 
Republicans do not show higher Perot activity correlating with distance from 
Bush’s ideology.
TABLE 2
trust gov’t
eval. of 
Congress
eval. of 
Sup. Court 
N
Adj. R2
Effect of alienation from government on Perot activism
Democrats 
B t-ratio
.263037 -2.222
.158191 -1.736
023525 .292
304
.03043
Independents 
B t-ratio
-.581616 -2.596
-.374464 -1.990
-.227363 -1.823
163
.05410
Republicans 
B t-ratio
-.088940 -.812
-.220058 -1.540
.068690 .946
352
.00908
Source: Perot sample data
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Alienation from Government
Much coverage portrayed the Perot movement as a populist uprising to, in the words 
of Perot himself, "take government back for the people." It is therefore plausible to think that 
a source of motivation for Perot activism may have been general voter anger and frustration. 
We might expect this to be the case particularly among independents, since they have no 
group tie to policymakers.
The general alienation present in the sample is straightforward: 40.6% of the entire 
sample reported that they could "almost never" trust the government in Washington to do 
what is right. On another traditional measure of alienation, the percentage of respondents 
answering that the government is run for all the people or for a few big interests looking out 
for themselves, 96.9% of the entire sample responded that the government is run for a few 
big interests. Such unanimity makes this variable unusable in a regression equation, since it 
shows no variance, although it is a clear indicator of alienation within the sample. (By 
comparison, 78.7% of the national electorate as measured by the 1992 NES said that 
government was run by and for a few big interests.)
In order to evaluate respondents’ affect toward government generally, I looked at two 
other variables: the respondents’ overall evaluation of Congress and their overall evaluation 
of the Supreme Court. These measures allow us to see if respondents’ anger at government 
waws diffuse or focused on a particular branch.
These three variables yield an interesting picture of the differences in general 
government-targeted alienation among the party groupings. Democrats show significant 
effects of trust in government and evaluation of Congress on Perot activism. This makes 
sense because Congress was generally perceived as a Democratic institution; those
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Democrats who held it in low esteem would feel alienated, and would be consequently more 
likely to defect from their party. Independents show a significant effect only for trust in 
government, and the effect is dramatic (B=-.58). This would suggest that the alienation of 
Independents was more diffuse, and not targeted at specific actors in the government. Finally, 
none of the three variables taken together is significant among Republicans; the strongest one 
is evaluation of Congress. Overall, the entire sample of potential Perot activists was alienated 
from government, but this anger was not very focused, and does not explain why 
Republicans’ Perot activity was higher than that of Democrats.
Issues
One of Rosenstone’s predictors of third-party vote is the salience of an issue 
neglected by the major parties. As the importance of a neglected issue increases, the potential 
electoral windfall for a party willing to address the issue also increases. Many published 
reports gave credit to Perot for focusing public attention on the deficit during the 1992 
campaign through his use of half-hour “infomercials” (Lichter and Noyes, 156). The extent 
to which different issues were important to members of different parties may offer some 
insight into the nature of party alienation and Perot’s appeal for these groups.
In order to test which issues were most important to the different party groupings in 
the Perot sample, Table 3 summarizes respondents’ answers to this question.
Among Democrats, the most frequent answer was national health insurance; of those 
identifying an issue as "most important," 32.5% gave this response. The next three most 
frequent responses are a balanced budget amendment (13.8%), restricting imports (13.2%), 
and a constitutional amendment banning abortion (12.4%). All other issues were much less
TABLE 3
Percent Identifying an Issue as “most important”*
Democrats Independents Republicans
nat’l health insurance 32.7% 21.2% 14.8%
balanced budget 13.4 17.5 27.9
import limits 13.8 9.5 7.4
abortion ban 12.3 10.9 10.8
term limits 8.9 15.3 22.6
pollution controls 8.2 6.6 3.7
deer, foreign involvement 5.9 8.0 5.7
Social Security taxes 3.0 4.4 2.7
increased gas taxes 1.5 2.2 2.7
affirmative action .4 4.4 1.7
Total for Perot issues 46.5% 56.9% 69.0%
Sample N 269 137 297
Responses from pre-election wave
Source: Perot sample data
22
prominent (the next is term limits, with 8.7%) 4
Much less consensus on a single issue is seen among Independents; the most frequent 
answer is again national health insurance, but with only 21.8%. Next is a balanced budget 
amendment, with 17.5%, then term limits with 16%, and limiting imports, 12.6%. Abortion 
is next, with 8.3%.
For Republicans, the most frequent answer was a balanced budget amendment 
(21.5%), followed by term limits (17.7%), national health insurance (16.9%), abortion 
(9.4%), and restricting imports (6.6%). Broadly speaking, national health insurance was a 
more prominent issue among Democrats than among Republicans or independents; also 
interestingly, term limits was chosen as the most important issue most frequently by 
Republicans.
For further comparison, we can compare these responses to responses of subjects in 
the Party Activist sample. The sample of Caucus attenders shows much more unity on which 
issues they consider "most important." Among Democrats, three issues account for 64% of 
those identifying an issue as most important; national health insurance with 39.9%, abortion 
with 15.1%, and a balanced budget amendment with 9.1%. Limits on imports, so prominent 
among Democrats in the Perot sample, was named most important by only 5.8% of Caucus 
attenders. Republican caucus attenders named a balanced budget amendment as the most
4It is important to note the nature of these results. They indicate a pattern of 
opinion on the salience of certain issues in relation to other specific issues, and do not 
predict activism for any given candidate because they do not indicate which candidate the 
respondent feels would do the best job on that issue. To a great extent, though, campaigns 
direct their energies toward bringing to the fore those issues which they expect will yield 
them electoral advantage. In this case, the Clinton campaign’s emphasis on health care 
seems to have landed on fertile ground.
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important issue in 30.4% of the cases, with abortion almost equally strong at 28.8%. The 
next closest issue among Republican caucus attenders was national health insurance, with 
7.9%. Term limits and the restricting of imports rated only 6.6% and 1.1% respectively.
Of the issues asked about, four were particularly important in the Perot campaign: a 
balanced budget, import limits, decreased foreign involvement, and term limits. Of those 
naming an issue as “most important,” 69% of Republicans named a Perot issue, compared 
with 56.9% of Independents and 46.5% of Democrats. Indeed, the two strongest issues 
among Republicans, a balanced budget and term limits, account for 50.5% of all the “most 
important issue” responses among Republicans; Perot emphasized both of these issues.
These results indicate that a greater proportion of potential Perot activists than 
traditional Democratic and Republican activists were concerned about congressional term 
limits and restrictions on imports, and that a smaller proportion were concerned about 
abortion. They also suggest that Perot drew more support among Republicans than among 
Democrats because he focused on the issues they found important, emphasizing, for instance, 
a balanced budget rather than abortion. By itself, however, the prominence of Perot issues 
among Republicans in the sample does not demonstrate agreement with Perot on these 
issues, only consensus that these issues were important. To evaluate whether activists agreed 
more with Perot’s issue positions than with those of the other candidates, we need to 
construct a spatial model. Here the hypothesis is that respondents evaluate their own issue 
positions relative to their perceptions of where the candidates stand on these issues, and 
choose to support the candidate whose positions most closely reflect their own. One of 
Rosenstone’s findings was that estrangement from the positions of the major party candidates 
only generates third party voting when the distance between the voter and the closest major
TABLE 4
Regression coefficients for perceived distance on issues from respondent to party and
Perot as a predictor of Perot activism
nat’l health insurance 
import limits 
affirmative action 
gas tax 
Adj. R2 
N
Democrats
.213329**
-.017606
.070427
-.030080
.03652
185
Independents
.344993
-.194335
-.215981
.030888
.00454
103
Republicans
-.037161
.200712**
-.114762
.134470*
.02432
232
*p=.10
**p>. 05
Source: Perot sample data
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party candidate is considerable (Rosenstone et al. 1984,163). Analyzing the impact of issues 
in this way can confirm or disconfirm the above finding of the impact of issues on Perot 
activism for Republicans.
Issues: Distance to Party
Unlike candidates, political parties rarely take a group of specific issue positions, 
although they do try to associate themselves with particular causes (such as anti-tax) and 
sometimes programs (such as Social Security).5 Were there issues in the 1992 campaign 
which respondents associated clearly with the parties and, finding themselves sufficiently in 
disagreement on these issues, reacted by supporting Perot? For four issues, affirmative action 
programs, limiting imports to protect American jobs, government-sponsored national health 
insurance, and a significant increase in federal gasoline taxes, respondents were asked to 
evaluate the position of Bush, Clinton, and Perot, as well as the Democratic and Republican 
parties. Of these issues, Democrats most clearly advocated national health insurance, and 
Republicans were most committed to free trade, while Perot was the most protectionist. Perot 
also advocated higher gasoline taxes, in contrast to the generally anti-tax stance of 
Republicans.
Among Democrats, national health insurance is the only significant issue of these 
four in predicting Perot activism.6 This observed significance reflects disagreement with the
5The principal exception is the party platform, written in late summer (after the 
“A” wave of the survey) and quickly forgotten as a guide to policy.
6The attitudinal measures were taken in the “A” wave, while the activity variable 
is a count of activities performed for the Perot/Stockdale campaign during the general 
election. Attitudes at Timej are therefore said to be predicting behavior at Time2.
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Democratic party’s relative support of national health insurance; Democrats who opposed 
such a program were more likely to work for Perot. For Republicans, the two issues of import 
limits and increased gas taxes are significant. The greater the distance between Republican 
respondents and their party on these issues relative to Perot (the more they favored import 
limits and increased gas taxes), the more Perot activity they performed.
To summarize the effect of ideology and issues at the individual level, Democrats 
defected from their party and supported Perot because they saw themselves as more 
conservative than Clinton or the Democratic party, and because they disagreed with the 
Democratic party’s approach to health care reform. Republicans, on the other hand, do not 
show higher Perot activity based on ideology, and their relative closeness to Perot on issues, 
specifically import restrictions and increased gas taxes, significantly affected their Perot 
involvement. Perot passively attracted Democrats who disagreed with the Democratic 
approach to health care reform, even though this issue was not a focus of his campaign. On 
the Republican side, Perot attracted Republicans who disagreed with Republican trade 
policy, and Perot as a candidate actively cultivated this disagreement, drawing clear lines 
between himself on the one hand and Bush and the Republican party on the other, by 
vigorously attacking the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement.
Aggregate Level Impact of Issues
We can now turn to the aggregate level to ask: do the issue effects for individuals 
observed above help explain why Republicans were more active for Perot than Democrats? 
In order to measure the aggregate level effect, I first regressed respondent issue positions for 
the four issues on Perot activity for each party grouping, controlling for overall trust in
TABLE 5
Effect of Issues on Perot Activism, Controlling for Alienation
Democrats
B t-ratio mean effect
trust in gov't -0.445 -3.05 -1.22 0.54
eval. of Congress 0.025 .245 -1.01 -0.03
import limits -0.126 -2.96 -0.67 0.08
nat'l health insurance 0.176 3.07 -1.96 -0.34
gas taxes -0.049 -1.20 -0.14 0.01
affirmative action 0.050 1.12 -0.32 -0.02
Net effect of issues -0.27
Constant 0.655416
N 180
Adj. R2 0.10596
Independents
B t-ratio mean effect
trust in gov't -0.093 -0.341 -1.54 0.14
eval. of Congress -0.097 -0.402 -1.63 0.16
import limits -0.127 -1.600 -0.93 0.12
nat'l health insurance 0.074 0.927 -1.52 -0.11
gas taxes -0.011 -0.152 -0.16 0.00
affirmative action 0.060 0.671 1.06 0.06
Net effect of issues 0.07
Constant 1.444104
N 96
Adj. R2 -0.008
Republicans
B t-ratio mean effect
trust in gov't -0.209 -1.496 -1.27 0.27
eval. of Congress -0.264 -1.467 -1.73 0.46
import limits -0.122 -2.704 -0.12 0.02
nat'l health insurance -0.027 -0.624 0.10 0.00
gas taxes -0.108 -2.503 0.72 -0.08
affirmative action 0.103 1.843 1.43 0.15
Net effect of issues 0.08
Constant 0.543942
N 216
Adj. R2 0.05875
Source: Perot sample data
TABLE 6
Net Effect of Issues on Perot Activism
Democrats
B t-ratio mean effect
import limits -0.117 -2.74 -0.69 0.08
nat'l health ins. 0.166 2.90 -1.97 -0.33
incr. gas taxes -0.041 -1.02 -0.16 0.01
affirmative action 0.042 0.96 -0.31 -0.01
Net effect -0.25
Constant 1.15
N 186
Adj. R2 0.061
Independents
B t-ratio mean effect
import limits -0.110 -1.429 -0.99 0.11
nat'l health ins. 0.069 0.891 -1.52 -0.10
incr. gas taxes 0.015 0.214 0.11 0.00
affirmative action 0.058 0.708 1.07 0.06
Net effect 0.07
Constant 1.73
N 102
Adj. R2 0.001
Republicans
B t-ratio mean effect
import limits -0.117 -2.724 -0.15 0.02
nat'l health ins. -0.018 -0.445 0.11 0.00
incr. gas taxes -0.098 -2.404 0.64 -0.06
affirmative action 0.108 1.965 1.49 0.16
Net effect 0.11
Constant 1.22
N 223
Adj. R2 0.046
Source; Perot sample data
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government and overall evaluation of Congress; these control variables were added in order 
to separate the issue effects from the effect of alienation. I used the respondents own 
positions, rather than their placement of the candidates, to avoid the selective perception of 
the positions of candidates whom they supported or opposed.
The regression coefficient represents the number and direction of units moved in 
Perot activity for each one point increase in the independent variable (such as position on 
import limits). The mean value for the issue position represents the difference between the 
group’s position and neutrality. Thus, by multiplying the mean issue position by the 
regression coefficient, we determine the net impact of the group’s issue position on the 
group’s activity. Results are shown in Table 5. The sum of the issue effects shows that issue 
positions were a net positive for Perot support among Republicans and Independents, and a 
net negative for Perot support among Democrats. In order to focus more specifically on the 
issue effects, Table 6 shows the results of the same analysis without the trust in government 
and evaluation of Congress variables.
The structure of the issues in Perot support is worth noting. We might assume that 
the Perot campaign attracted support from partisans by staking out centrist positions, for 
example by drawing Democrats who were opposed to an issue and Republicans who favored 
it, in which case the sign of the regression coefficient would be positive for Democrats and 
negative for Republicans. The signs of the coefficients show that this was clearly not the 
case with the issues of import limits, gas taxes, and affirmative action. Rather than attracting 
Democrats with conservative views and Republicans with liberal views, for both parties the 
more respondents favored import restrictions, the more they did for Perot’s campaign. 
Likewise for both parties, the more respondents favored increased gas taxes and opposed
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affirmative action, the more activity they performed for Perot.
The bulk of the net positive effect for issue positions among Republicans is 
attributable to the issue of affirmative action. The more Republicans opposed affirmative 
action, the more they did for Perot, and the mean Republican position was firm opposition. 
The net effect for all issues is an increase in Perot activity o f . 11 units on a scale of zero to 6.
On the Democratic side the net negative effect on Perot activity derives from the issue 
of national health insurance. Although Democrats performed more Perot activity the more 
they opposed national health insurance, the mean Democratic position was strong support, 
producing a strong negative overall effect on Perot activity among Democrats. The net effect 
for all issues in -.25 units of activity.
Independents show interesting issue effects. While their support for import limits 
increased their Perot activity, their support for national health insurance decreased it by about 
the same amount, yielding a very small net positive effect for all issues. Their predisposition 
to Perot activity apart from issues, as measured by the intercept term, is the highest of the 
three groups.
To summarize, issues do help to explain why Republicans were more active for Perot 
than Democrats, because the issue positions of Republican respondents added to their Perot 
activity, while the positions of Democrats subtracted from their Perot activity.
Economic Performance
Among the arguments advanced by Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory o f 
Democracy (1957) is that voters react to particularly good or bad economic times by 
punishing or rewarding incumbents based on fluctuations in mean per capita income, in the
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process deviating from party loyalties. This idea was developed by Kramer, who found 
effects of fluctuations in real personal income in election voting for the House of 
Representatives (1971). More recent work has found that individuals do not hold government 
generally accountable for difficulties with personal finances (Brody and Sniderman, 1977) 
but only for broader economic effects (Kiewet, 1981). Rosenstone et al. found general 
economic adversity to contribute to the likelihood of a third party vote, both in terms of 
personal finances and for perceptions of the economy as a whole (Rosenstone et al., 1984). 
In contrast, Craig (1993) points to a body of work which undermines the idea that citizens 
vote their pocketbooks, but that they do hold government accountable for general economic 
downturns.
In the command center for the 1992 Clinton campaign, strategist James Carville 
posted a list of the themes for the day. Some themes would be replaced by others, only to 
reappear later, but the number one spot always read, “It’s the Economy, Stupid.” Clearly the 
national economy, still in recession in 1992, was seen as the Bush administration’s biggest 
electoral weakness, and reporting after the election proclaimed that “Anger at the Economy 
Was the Glue Binding Supporters to Perot” (Dionne, 1992). Assuming this is correct in the 
case of voters, how did the economy affect activists for Perot? Do the effects vary by party, 
and if so, does this effect help explain why Republicans were more active than Democrats? 
Given that Democrats who were dissatisfied with the economy could support Clinton, and 
given that Independents were the most predisposed to support Perot, we might expect to find 
an effect for evaluations of the economy only among Republicans. In addition, Republicans 
should be most likely to evaluate the economy positively under a Republican administration, 
so those Republicans who reject Bush based on the economy should show higher Perot
TABLE 7
Regression coefficients for evaluations of the economy on Perot activism
nat’l economy past 12 mo. 
nat’l economy next 12 mo. 
Adj R2 
N
Source: Perot sample data
Democrats 
B t-ratio
.1191 1.22
-.1225 -1.60
.004 
273
Independents 
B t-ratio
.0389 .228
.1752 -1.37
.001 
153
Republicans 
B t-ratio 
-.280744 .0001
-.108213 .0782
.089 
332
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activity. Table 6 shows this to be the case.
Respondents were asked to rate how well they thought the nation’s economy had been 
doing over the previous 12 months and how well they thought it would do over the next 12 
months. The only respondents for whom evaluations of the national economy are significant 
are Republicans, who showed more Perot activity the lower they rated the economy. The 
effect of the retrospective evaluation is more than twice as strong as the outlook for the 
future. This suggests that only Republicans may have used an incumbent performance rule 
on the economy in guiding their choices for activism. The strong effect indicates that 
negative evaluations of the economy did much to overcome Republican party loyalty.
Because this was a three-way election, the second step of an incumbent performance 
rule is to evaluate the candidates based on their ability to manage the economy. Such an 
analysis will potentially show both push and pull effects based on negative and positive 
evaluations of the candidates' abilities on this dimension. A look at the evidence indicates 
that perceptions of how well Perot would deal with economic problems is a powerful 
predictor of Perot activism for all party groupings, but particularly among Republicans.
These results show both push and pull effects; Democrats who thought Clinton would 
handle the economy poorly and Perot would do well were likely to work for Perot. 
Independents show push effects from both major party candidates; the reason that attraction 
to Perot on this dimension is not significant is that independents rated Perot so positively that 
there is little variance (note that the coefficient is larger than for the two significant ones). 
At the same time, the overall effect on activism is as strong as that of the negative 
evaluations of Bush, and stronger than those of Democrats. Republicans show strong push 
effects away from Bush, but even stronger pull effects toward Perot.
TABLE 8
Effect on Perot activism of evaluations of ability to handle economic problems
Democrats 
B t-ratio
Bush 0.073893 0.582
Clinton 0.355634 4.006
Perot -0.389668 -4.706
N 240
Adj. R2 0.11585
Source: Perot sample data
Independents 
B t-ratio
0.16707 0.946
0.298764 2.59
-0.497682 -3.238
139
0.07699
Republicans 
B t-ratio
0.332785 4.351
0.233054 2.759
-0.522614 -5.577
290 
0.14877
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In sum, Republicans were motivated to Perot activism by concern over the national 
economy more than any other group, were pushed away from their party by Bush’s handling 
of the economy, and were attracted to what they saw as Perot’s ability to handle the 
economy. Given the prominence of the economy in the campaign, this is an important 
difference between Democrats and Republicans. The combined implication of Republicans’ 
negative views of the economy, combined with their negative evaluations of Bush’s ability 
to steer it back onto a growth path, is that perceptions of the economy did much to boost 
Perot’s support among Republicans.
Impact of the Economy Relative to That of Issues
Having established that both issues and the economy account for some of the 
difference in Perot activity between Republicans and Democrats, we can combine these 
variables into one analysis to determine which had the greater effect. If economic concerns 
dominate over issue positions, this would be good news for the Republican party, because 
it would suggest that Republicans who supported Perot would be likely to return to the party 
if economic circumstances were better. On the other hand, if issues have a greater effect than 
the economy, this would suggest that this group of Republicans are open to future appeals 
based on issues from outside the party, regardless of economic conditions.
Table 9 shows that the effects vary by party. For Democrats, issues were more 
important than perceptions of the economy in shaping Perot activism, and the effect is 
negative. Independents shared the concerns of Democrats over health care, since the effect 
of issues is negative for them as well, while the enonomy is positive, but not strikingly so.
Republicans show that not only were issues a net positive for Perot, but the economy
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was as well, and to a much greater extent. The net effect for the two economic variables is 
.27, while the net effect for issues is .10. Particularly striking is the size of the retrospective 
evaluation; Republicans were particularly disappointed by the economy’s performance over 
the previous twelve months.
TABLE 9
Effect of Issues on Activism, Controlling for National
Economy
Democrats
B t-ratio mean effect
nat'l economy past year -0.2218 -1.94 1.382 -0.31
nat'l economy next year 0.1681 1.934 0.588 0.10
affirmative action 0.0016 0.037 -0.224 0.00
balanced budget -0.0258 -0.645 3.036 -0.08
import limits -0.1338 -3.128 -0.564 0.08
nat'l health insurance 0.1838 3.241 -1.988 -0.37
Constant 1.492
N 165
Adjusted R2 0.108
Net effect for issues
Independents
-0.37
B t-ratio mean effect
nat'l economy past year 0.0360 0.161 1.245 0.04
nat'l economy next year 0.0816 0.492 0.67 0.05
affirmative action 0.0670 0.756 1.032 0.07
balanced budget -0.0835 -0.9 2.032 -0.17
import limits -0.0819 -0.921 -1.000 0.08
nat'l health insurance 0.0931 1.04 -1.564 -0.15
Constant 1.852
N 94
Adjusted R2 -0.013
Net effect for issues
Republicans
-0.16
B t-ratio mean effect
nat'l economy past year 0.3289 3.019 0.784 0.26
nat'l economy next year 0.1208 1.341 0.05 0.01
affirmative action 0.1037 1.979 1.486 0.15
balanced budget -0.0362 -0.67 1.959 -0.07
import limits -0.0551 -1.249 -0.203 0.01
nat'l health insurance 0.0126 0.297 0.104 0.00
Constant 1.014
N 222
Adjusted R2 0.0861
Net effect for issues 0.10
Source: Perot sample data
SECTION V: CONCLUSIONS
Republicans were more active for Perot than Democrats in part because they agreed 
more with Perot than with the Republican party or its nominee on the issue of import limits, 
and agreed more with Perot than the Republican party on the need for increased gas taxes. 
More significantly, Republicans thought that Bush had mishandled the economy and that 
Perot would do a better job.
There exists a group of Republican activists susceptible to appeals for limiting trade 
and increasing at least one type of tax. Whether these issues are pursued by Perot, another 
independent candidate, a Republican, or a Democrat, they represent a potential fault line 
within a party trying to reclaim the White House. The good news is that economic conditions 
and candidates change with time; Bush and the recession for which some Republicans 
blamed him are in the past, and the next campaign will be fought on different ground.
The Perot campaign was an attack on the status quo, which included a Republican 
president. Democrats who agreed with Perot's points could abide by their party identification 
and support Clinton; some who thought he was too liberal, or who disagreed with the party 
on certain issues, such as national health insurance, supported Perot, particularly those who 
thought Perot would be better at handling the economy, but the broad majority of Democrats 
supported national health insurance, and supported their party's nominee.
Independents were most likely to support Perot in the first place, rather than the 
candidates of the major parties, in keeping with their Independent status. In addition, they
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were the most alienated from government. Their positions on issues did not significantly 
affect their Perot activity.
Republicans defected to Perot not because they felt an ideological gap between 
themselves and their party or its nominee. Some Republican Perot supporters were pulled 
toward Perot's stance on import limits and gasoline taxes, and pushed away from the 
Republican party's support of NAFTA. Overall, they were very concerned about the 
economy, and were not confident in Bush's ability to handle economic problems. Those who 
were most opposed to affirmative action, perhaps choosing between Perot and Clinton, 
supported Perot because they saw him as more conservative on this issue.
The above analysis holds both good news and bad news for the Republican party. The 
good news is that the anger Republicans felt toward the economy and President Bush will 
rapidly dissipate in future campaigns as economic conditions change and Bush retires. In 
addition, affirmative action is an easy issue on which Republicans can recover activists by 
"leaning right," although this is probably not necessary. The bad news is that the 1992 debate 
over protectionism versus free trade exposed a rift in the Republican party. To the extent that 
this issue, and to a lesser extent the issue of higher gasoline taxes, plays a role in future 
campaigns, Republican Perot activists have already demonstrated a willingness to work 
against the Republican party in favor of a candidate who shares their views.
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